INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 1998, the Kenyan government seized control of World Duty Free's stores inside the Nairobi and Mombasa International Airports. 1 The government had one goal: destroy evidence that World Duty Free obtained the contract for their duty-free stores through a bribe of approximately $2 million to Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi's reelection campaign. 2 After the Kenyan government seized the stores, World Duty Free, an Isle of Man corporation, initiated investor-state arbitration 3 under the bilateral investment treaty between the Isle of Man and Kenya. 4 Although the arbitral tribunal acknowledged that President Moi solicited the bribe, 5 the tribunal declined to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute because the initial deal was tainted by corruption. 6 As a result, World Duty Free lost its investment and President Moi retained the $2 million. 7 The tribunal's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over World Duty Free's case illustrates an evolving dilemma in investment arbitration. How should tribunals handle disputes tainted by corruption allegations?
Investment tribunals are empowered to arbitrate disputes between host states and investors under international legal frameworks that provide substantive and procedural protections for private investments. 8 Numerous host states, however, have argued that investments tainted by corruption or similar illegality do not qualify for protection and thus that tribunals lack subject-matter jurisdiction 9 over these disputes. 10 Arbitral tribunals have been responsive to these host states' arguments and have declined to exercise jurisdiction over disputes tainted by corruption. 11 When investment tribunals decline to exercise jurisdiction over these disputes, however, tribunals undermine their intended purpose to incentivize investment 12 and promote development. 13 To remedy this predicament, this Note proposes a framework for the adjudication of corruption claims in investment arbitration. It argues that tribunals should invoke equitable estoppel to accept jurisdiction over the dispute and use a contributory-fault approach to determine liability. 14 This framework would bolster the investment-arbitration and anticorruption regimes, thereby incentivizing investment and promoting development. 7 . Although Kenyan law makes soliciting bribes illegal, the tribunal lamented the fact that "no attempt has been made by Kenya to prosecute [the president] for corruption or to recover the bribe in civil proceedings." Id . at ¶ 180. . . that the necessary condition for an investment to benefit from the Treaty is to be made in accordance with the domestic legislation of each of the Contracting Parties . . . ."); see also ALOYSIUS P. LLAMZON, CORRUPTION IN Part I traces the history of international investment treaties and discusses their intended role in promoting economic development. Part II argues that investment tribunals' mismanagement of corruption claims undermines the purpose of these treaties. It also explains how this phenomenon subverts the global fight against corruption. Part III advocates that arbitral tribunals should accept jurisdiction over disputes tainted by corruption and evaluate each party's role in the corrupt act. Ultimately, this Note presents an actionable solution to an increasingly salient issue in investment arbitration and international development.
I. THE RISE OF THE MODERN INVESTMENT TREATY
Since World War II, international investment has been recognized as a valuable tool for achieving economic-integration and developmental goals. 15 Achieving these goals, however, required adequate incentives and protections for investors. Bilateral investment treaties and their dispute resolution systems, commonly known as investment arbitration, provided those incentives. Section I.A highlights the history of international investment treaties and describes the developmental goals articulated at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Section I.B explains the nature of bilateral investment treaties and investment arbitration. Section I.C describes the overlap between the investment-arbitration and anti-corruption regimes.
A. The Purpose of International Investment Treaties
International investment treaties date back to the late eighteenth century, when countries began forming treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation to promote commercial relations between signatories. 16 The first agreement of this type was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 17 signed by the United States and France in 1782. 18 Although their provisions were broader than those in modern investment treaties, the early treaties had the similar goal of protecting the interests of nationals whose states were parties to the treaties. 19 For instance, these treaties sought to protect nationals' property abroad and guaranteed them favorable trading terms in exchange for conducting business in the foreign country. 20 Over the next 150 years, countries steadily formed treaties and global investment increased. 21 But after the Great Depression and two world wars, the global economy collapsed. 22 Western world leaders who grew weary of the bloodshed saw economic integration as the key to secure and maintain world peace. 23 In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill laid the groundwork for this peace in the Atlantic Charter. 24 In the Charter, they articulated an international interest in reducing trade restrictions and promoting economic integration. 25 They strove to "bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all . . . economic advancement." 26 The Atlantic Charter was premised on the theory that with a sufficient level of economic integration, the conditions that led to war in the first place might be ameliorated. This philosophy also inspired the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. 27 At the Bretton Woods Conference, world leaders created the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which would eventually become the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help manage the global monetary system. 28 The International Bank and the IMF helped liberalize trade, which bolstered global economic growth and promoted international investment. 29 Although foreign investment cannot cure all of a society's ills, "it can provide a way to jump-start economies, a short cut to higher wages, an improved infrastructure, better schools and hospitals, and more efficient and cost effective public services." 30 Numerous provisions in the Bretton Woods Agreement specifically sought to achieve 21 these developmental goals 31 as a means to secure peace. 32 But as the world grew more economically integrated and concerns about uncompensated expropriation increased, the international investment community demanded stronger protections for investors. 33
B. Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Arbitration
Bretton Woods laid the foundations for the post-WWII economic order. But at the same time, some developing countries-particularly those pursuing import-substitution policies 34 -closed their doors to investment. 35 Even in countries that allowed investment, there were numerous cases of expropriation where the host government seized private property for state control. 36 The old treaties relied on norms of customary international law, which sought to generalize the legal practices of states. 37 But customary international law was too weak to protect investors because of its inconsistent enforcement and limited protections. 38 To achieve the economic-integration and developmental goals envisioned in the Atlantic Charter and enshrined at Bretton Woods, the international community needed to incentivize investment in an uncertain environment. This meant finding a tool to "provide 31. ERIC HELLEINER, FORGOTTEN FOUNDATIONS OF BRETTON WOODS: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE MAKING OF THE POSTWAR ORDER 109-12 (2014) (noting that the Bretton Woods agreement included multiple provisions aimed at helping developing countries: (1) the World Bank was charged with "mobilizing international development finance," (2) countries could receive short-term loans, (3) capital flight from developing countries was minimized, and (4) countries could restructure their debts).
32 . See Ikenberry, supra note 27, at 170 (stating that participants at Bretton Woods saw an open international trading system as "fundamental to the maintenance of peace"); Pehle, supra note 15, at 1139 (claiming that "the success of the Fund and the Bank will be a mighty force in facilitating the far more difficult task of securing complete and wholehearted cooperation for the maintenance of peace through the United Nations").
33 . See Vandevelde, supra note 16, at 167-69. 34. Import-substitution policies aim to produce goods and supply services locally rather than import them from more developed countries. See 38. Customary international law was enforced through a form of dispute resolution known as espousal, which proved "unsatisfactory" because it relied on a state to enforce an investor's claim. This presented diplomatic difficulties and provided an insufficient guarantee of protection for investors. See Vandevelde, supra note 16, at 159-61.
clear rules and effective enforcement mechanisms" for investors 39 and thus reduce risks. 40 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) were that tool. 41 BITs create a "legal framework to facilitate and protect those investments" 42 by imposing obligations on host states regarding the basic substantive and procedural protections states must afford to outside investors. 43 They also help mitigate some international investment risks. Before making an investment, investors assess the risks associated with that investment 44 -a task complicated by the "inherent unpredictability of human and government conduct." 45 Faced with these risks, investors might decide to forgo an investment altogether. 46 To mitigate investors' concerns, states form BITs, which establish the conditions for private investment by citizens of companies of one state in the other. 47 Substantively, BITs provide a variety of protections for investors. For instance, they usually include provisions ensuring fair and equitable treatment, which protect investments against discriminatory interference or adverse governmental action. 48 In addition, BITs typically offer national or mostfavored-nation status to investors, meaning that the host state will not treat the investor less favorably than it treats its own national or other interna- investor may promise to build a factory in a country but never build it. A host government may enact a low corporate tax rate in one year with a promise never to raise it, yet pass legislation to increase taxes drastically the day after an investor makes an investment.").
46. Many investment arbitrations arise from international-finance projects that involve more than one jurisdiction, subjecting them to multiple investment treaties and making predictability even more important. See tional investors. 49 Finally, BITs include expropriation protection, limiting the host state's ability to seize an investment. 50 Procedurally, BITs typically contain a dispute-resolution clause that allows investors to rely on international investment arbitration to address alleged violations of the treaty. 51 Arbitral proceedings typically operate according to the procedural rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an arm of the World Bank, but are occasionally run under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules or on an ad hoc basis. 52 These frameworks are incorporated into the investment treaty itself. 53 Once included in the treaty, investment arbitration functions more like a contract than a treaty: it is essentially an open offer by the state to arbitrate, which may then be accepted by aggrieved investors. 54 By including a dispute-resolution mechanism, a state commits to provide investors with an arbitral forum. 55 In theory, this commitment creates a more stable investment environment. 56 It decreases costs for investors and host states alike because investors can avoid internalizing-and passing on to the state-the risk of losing their investment altogether. 57 Thus, access to arbitration reduces business costs and encourages investment. 58 49. Salacuse, supra note 41, at 668. 50 . Id . at 670 (noting that a "state may not expropriate property of an alien except: (1) for a public purpose; (2) in a nondiscriminatory manner; (3) upon payment of compensation; and, in most instances, (4) with provision for some form of judicial review" In the years since the Cold War, states have signed BITs at a record pace. 59 But the investment treaty regime has its critics, 60 and commentators have recently debated whether investment arbitration should be included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 61 -an attempted agreement that would have expanded international trade and investment. 62 Despite concerns over investment arbitration, however, states continue to sign investment treaties. 63 To date, states across the globe have ratified more than 2,946 BITs and 376 treaties with investment provisions, making these treaties a cornerstone of the modern international economy. 64
C. The Interplay Between Investment Arbitration and Anti-Corruption
Tools that promote economic integration and development, such as investment treaties and arbitration, do not operate in a vacuum. Instead, they overlap with other legal regimes-such as the global fight against corruption. 65 In tandem with BITs' prevalence, enforcement of the global anticorruption regime has significantly increased. 66 The modern anti-corruption regime began in 1974 after the Watergate Committee uncovered illegal campaign contributions, international money laundering, and more than $300 million in foreign bribes. 67 When the investigations incriminated public officials from an array of countries, including Venezuela, Italy, Japan, Ghana, Mexico, Iran, and the Philippines, it became clear that corruption was a global problem. 68 In response, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits bribery of foreign officials, in 1977. 69 But the world community was slow to follow the United States' example. Until recently, many foreign investors and governments saw bribery as part of the cost of doing business abroad. 70 The expectation of bribery was so ingrained that it made its way into states' laws: until the 1990s, Germany and France considered bribes paid by their companies to foreign officials a tax-deductible business expense. 71 Beginning in late 1997, however, the international community joined the American anti-corruption effort and passed global anti-corruption conventions. First, the Organisation for Economic Co- bribery legislation. The OECD Convention, which currently has forty-four signatories accounting for nearly two-thirds of the world's exports, 77 and UNCAC, which subjects 186 countries to its provisions, 78 implore their signatories to enact domestic legislation to combat bribery. 79 Together, these conventions and legislative efforts demonstrate a global interest in fighting corruption.
The rise of anti-corruption enforcement has important implications for investment arbitration, which in turn affects international development. Yet anti-corruption enforcement has been hindered by investment tribunals' lack of engagement with corruption claims. Since World Duty Free in 2006, 80 investment tribunals have declined to exercise jurisdiction when a host state raises corruption allegations. 81 When investment tribunals decline to exercise jurisdiction, they vitiate the protections afforded to investments and distort the incentive structure for international investment. 82 This distortion impedes development.
II. INVESTMENT TRIBUNALS AND THE MISHANDLING OF CORRUPTION CLAIMS
Investment arbitration was designed to facilitate investment as a means to promote development and achieve peace. 83 But international investment tribunals fail to fulfill their purpose when they decline to exercise jurisdiction over disputes tainted by corruption. Section II.A discusses how arbitral tribunals have declined to exercise jurisdiction over disputes after a host state raises corruption allegations as an affirmative defense. Section II.B argues that arbitral tribunals undermine the international anti-corruption regime because they ignore the host state's role in the corruption. Finally, Section II.C contends that tribunals' mistreatment of corruption claims in- 79. OECD Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(3) (imploring states to "take such measures as may be necessary to provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery . . . or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are applicable"); UNCAC, supra note 74, art. appropriately deprives investors of arbitral recourse and consequently impairs international investment. In so doing, existing investment arbitration practices hinder economic development.
A. The Current Mishandling of Corruption Claims
Investment tribunals' refusal to exercise jurisdiction over corruptiontainted disputes 84 constitutes a mishandling of corruption claims. 85 This mishandling is understandable because investment treaties themselves typically provide little guidance on how tribunals should handle corruption allegations: of the over 3,000 investment treaties completed since 1959, almost none address corruption. 86 Moreover, corruption manifests in multifarious ways 87 and is difficult to define, 88 which makes it even more challenging for tribunals to evaluate how it affected an underlying contract. In the absence of a clear directive indicating how corruption should affect investment arbitration, some host states have raised corruption allegations as an affirmative defense to deprive investment tribunals of jurisdiction over disputes. 89 There are two primary adjudicatory phases to an investment arbitration proceeding: a jurisdictional phase and a merits phase. 90 At the jurisdictional phase, the investment tribunal determines whether it has authority to hear a given dispute and whether the claims are admissible. 91 phase is important because it establishes whether an investor will have access to the investment tribunal itself. 92 If the tribunal decides that it lacks jurisdiction or that the claims are inadmissible, the investor's case will not proceed to the merits phase. 93 ICSID Article 25(1) gives arbitral tribunals jurisdiction to resolve a "legal dispute arising directly out of an investment." 94 But when the investment at issue is fouled by corruption, tribunals typically determine that it does not qualify as an "investment" under the ICSID Convention and, consequently, that the tribunal lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. 95 Several host states have succeeded in raising corruption as a defense because the ICSID Convention fails to clearly define investment. 96 This definitional shortcoming is compounded by tribunals' increasing tendency to take a "restrictive approach" to exercising jurisdiction over investment disputes. 97 A restrictive approach to jurisdiction defeats tribunals' role in affording access to arbitral recourse for aggrieved investors and, if it continues, will "do real damage to the international investment regime." 98 In the corruption context, investment tribunals offer two primary reasons for declining jurisdiction: international public policy 99 and the requirement that investments comply with host state laws. 100 92. CRAWFORD, supra note 37, at 693 (noting that a successful objection to jurisdiction would "stop all proceedings in the case, since they deprive the tribunal of the authority to give rulings as to the admissibility or substance of the claim" international public policy justification, tribunals prevent an offending party from obtaining relief because combating corruption is a global value 101 and it would be unjust to assist a party that is "guilty of illegal (or immoral) conduct." 102 In 1963, this justification made its way into international arbitration in the oft-cited ICC Case No. 1110. 103 There, Judge Lagergren declined to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute because the underlying contract was procured with a bribe, and bribery is contrary to "international public policy common to the community of nations." 104 This same principle may be used to refuse the enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention, 105 which governs proceedings conducted pursuant to the UNCITRAL procedural rules 106 and is similar to the American "unclean hands" doctrine. 107 Modern investment tribunals have reaffirmed the principle that corruption, at least corruption affecting the procurement of the contract, violates international public policy and justifies a jurisdictional declination. 108 Other investment tribunals have declined to exercise jurisdiction because the disputed investment did not comply with the host state's laws. 109 Most BITs contain a provision that requires that investments be made "in accordance with host state laws." 110 Because most states are subject to UNCAC and are expected to pass domestic anti-corruption legislation, 111 host states generally criminalize corruption. 112 Therefore, when a host state raises a corruption allegation, it is able to rely on the "in accordance with host state laws" provision to argue that the corrupt act deprives the investor of protections and that the tribunal thus lacks jurisdiction. 113 Investment tribunals have been responsive to these arguments. 114 In 2013, the investment tribunal in Metal-Tech Ltd . v . Republic of Uzbekistan found that Metal-Tech, an Israeli company, had paid consultants more than $4 million to illicitly procure a contract from the Uzbek government to operate a manufacturing plant. 115 The underlying Israel-Uzbekistan BIT required investments to comply with local law, and because Uzbek law prohibits bribery, the investment tribunal declined to exercise jurisdiction over the company's claim that Uzbekistan had improperly terminated a contract. 116 Regardless of their specific justification, arbitral tribunals that decline to exercise jurisdiction over disputes tainted by corruption deprive investors of access to an arbitral forum for their claims. he rights of the investor against the host State, including the right of access to arbitration, could not be protected because the investment was tainted by illegal activities, specifically corruption. The law is clear-and rightly so-that in such a situation the investor is deprived of protection and, consequently, the host State avoids any potential liability."). 
B. Mishandling Corruption Claims Undermines Anti-Corruption Efforts
Allowing a host state to invoke its own malfeasance to avoid liability disproportionately punishes investors and unfairly advantages corrupt states. 117 Corruption is not a unilateral act-a host state has either requested or accepted a bribe paid by an investor. 118 In World Duty Free Co . v . Republic of Kenya, the tribunal recognized that the $2 million bribe was "solicited by the Kenyan President and not wholly initiated by the [investor] ." 119 The investor was merely one party to the corruption-"it takes two to tango." 120 A tribunal that declines to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute after the host state raises the corruption defense fails to hold the host state accountable for its role in the bribe. This creates a perverse incentive for states to solicit, or at least turn a blind eye to, bribery and corruption. 121 Tribunals that recognize the corruption defense not only fail to hold corrupt host states accountable; they also fail to meet international anticorruption standards. UNCAC is the most comprehensive global anticorruption convention in the world. 122 Its key feature, building on the FCPA and the OECD Convention, is that it fights both supply-side and demandside corruption. 123 Addressing both sides of a bribe is crucial because a corrupt bargain implicates parties on both sides. 124 Therefore, it is appropriate to punish the "foreign investors who supply the cash component of a bribe" 125 and the host state that solicited or demanded the bribe. 126 Ultimate-117 . See id . at ¶ 389 ("While reaching the conclusion that the claims are barred as a result of corruption, the Tribunal is sensitive to the ongoing debate that findings on corruption often come down heavily on claimants, while possibly exonerating defendants that may have themselves been involved in the corrupt acts.").
118. LLAMZON, supra note 10, § 11.21 (critiquing the corruption defense as scrutinizing the "conduct of only one of the two principal actors that participated in the corrupt act").
119 124. LLAMZON, supra note 10, § 1.14 (noting that while it is tempting to "view transnational corruption as a Manichean fable where the world is divided between villainous foreign investors and the largely good but easily tempted public officials of poor countries," this view "ignore[s] a far more complicated reality").
125 . Id . § 11.20. 126. Klaw, supra note 85, at 371. ly, UNCAC reflects a recognition by the international community "that addressing the demand side of bribery is as important as-or even more important than-addressing the supply side." 127 As it stands, many countries underenforce their own anti-corruption laws, due in large part to a lack of resources and political will. 128 Investment tribunals could fill the gaps by serving as a venue for the private enforcement of anti-corruption efforts. 129 This potential remains unfulfilled because investment tribunals have continued to shut their doors to investors who were but one party to a bribe. 130 There is also a more pernicious externality to ignoring the demand side of bribery: corruption is a serious obstacle to a state's long-term development. 131 While corruption exacerbates inequality, impairs GDP growth, and undermines the rule of law, 132 it is primarily the poor who must live with its deleterious effects. 133 Additionally, corruption fosters "social disharmony . . . as government officials lose the trust of people and foster active resistance to taxation by the corrupt government, thereby ensuring a permanently dysfunctional and unresponsive government." 134 When that happens, "all eventually suffer." 135 
C. Mishandling Corruption Claims Undermines International Development
Tribunals' refusal to hear corruption claims undermines the incentive structure for international investment. The economic order articulated at Bretton Woods sought to facilitate economic growth and development [Vol. 118:117 through foreign direct investment. 136 The need for growth and development rested on a paradox, however, because developing states that needed investment the most lacked a strong "rule of law" and were thus the riskiest for investors. 137 BITs proved a mutually beneficial answer for developing and developed states 138 : investors received investment protection, 139 and states that committed to a stable legal framework would be more likely to receive the benefit of foreign investment. 140 BITs have been remarkably successful in facilitating investment and economic growth. For example, numerous studies have found a positive correlation between investment treaties and subsequent foreign direct investment. 141 And in terms of direct economic impact, one study found that the typical BIT with the United States as a party correlated to approximately $1 billion in increased foreign direct investment per year for the signing state. 142 Despite concerns that investors are the primary beneficiaries, 143 host states' continued negotiation and usage of BITs underscores the fact that they perceive a benefit from the system. 144 Indeed, while American investors bene-136 . See supra Section I.A. 137. LLAMZON, supra note 10, § 1.11 ("Sensible investors seek the stability that comes with the 'rule of law,' it is said, and those parts of the world embroiled in autocracy and repression-often also the poorest of nations-should by any coldly rational calculation be bypassed by foreign investors.").
138 . See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 77 ("Thus, a BIT between a developed and a developing country is founded on a grand bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future.").
139. Mortenson, supra note 96, at 267 ("Capital-importing countries [can] promote economic development by offering substantive guarantees of protection to foreign investors; capital-exporting countries [can] achieve some modicum of security for their citizens investing overseas."); see also Helen V. Milner, The Global Economy, FDI, and the Regime for Investment, 66 WORLD POL. 1, 4 (2014) (arguing that capital-poor nations can facilitate foreign direct investment by reassuring investors that their capital investments will not be expropriated by the host state fit, 145 the states receiving the investment are expected to benefit as well due to the increase of business and capital. 146 But when tribunals decline to exercise jurisdiction, they undercut investors' protections; this undermines the relationship between investment and economic growth. 147 In sum, an investment tribunal that declines to exercise jurisdiction undermines the developmental goals of the investment treaty framework. 148 Tribunals are obliged to consider these goals in interpreting the applicable investment treaty. 149 And investment tribunals have noted that economic development was the "purpose which Bilateral Investment Treaties and the World Bank itself were created to serve." 150 When international investment tribunals mistreat corruption claims by declining to exercise jurisdiction, they reduce investor confidence in the international investment regime as a whole. 151 This reduced confidence in turn reduces foreign direct investment and hinders economic development, making it more difficult to reduce poverty and raise living standards. 152 This trend of jurisdictional deprivation justifies a reassessment of how investment arbitration tribunals handle corruption claims.
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III. THE POTENTIAL ADJUDICATION OF CORRUPTION CLAIMS
Arbitral tribunals must provide a stable and predictable forum for dispute resolution to incentivize investment and promote development. 153 An investment tribunal that declines to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute fouled by corruption fails the international community. It fails the host states who are incentivized to ignore corrupt practices within their borders, 154 the people in developing countries who are denied developmental gains, 155 and the investors who rely on arbitration to protect their investments. 156 This Part proposes a path forward. Section III.A presents a framework for the adjudication of corruption claims. Section III.B explains how this framework helps achieve the goals of both the investment-arbitration and anticorruption regimes. Section III.C describes how this framework advances developmental objectives.
A. The Proposed Framework
This Note proposes a framework that arbitral tribunals should adopt when handling disputes tainted by corruption. Tribunals should use equitable estoppel to defeat a host state's corruption defense and allow the case to proceed to the merits phase. When considering the corruption claim in the merits phase of the arbitration, the tribunal should then use a contributoryfault approach to determine liability. Together, this solution would help incentivize investment, combat corruption, and promote development.
Arbitral tribunals should use equitable estoppel to bar a host state's invocation of the corruption defense. After defeating a host state's corruption defense, tribunals should accept jurisdiction and evaluate each party's role in the corruption. 157 Currently, arbitral tribunals justify depriving investors of arbitral recourse because corruption violates international public policy and because corruption violates a host state's laws. 158 These justifications reflect a "traditional approach" to handling corruption in international disputes, whereby both parties assume the risk of contract invalidation. 159 157. In a "bifurcated" proceeding, where the proceedings are separated into distinct phases (i.e. jurisdictional and merits), the proposed framework would advance the dispute into the latter phase. In a nonbifurcated proceeding, the proposed framework would allow the tribunal to consider the corruption claim directly. tional approach works when either party could serve as respondent or claimant, meaning that neither party can "opportunistically anticipate whether they will be in the position of . . . walking away from the contract" by invoking the corruption defense. 160 But this logic falls apart in investment arbitration because the host state is almost always the respondent, which means that the investor (as the claimant) bears the risk of arbitral deprivation. 161 A bribe between an investor and a host state implicates both parties, but the unique structure of investment arbitration produces a liability asymmetry between the investor and the host state. 162 Arbitrators themselves have noted that the investment arbitration structure disproportionately places blame on the investor. 163 To rebalance the liability asymmetry, arbitral tribunals should "consider the equities emerging from an analysis of both parties' conduct." 164 Equitable estoppel is a natural response: corrupt host states should not benefit from their part in corruption. 165 Equitable estoppel is an accepted doctrine of international law that would bar the host state from invoking its own illicit conduct to deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction. 166 The doctrine requires a state to act consistently with respect to the enactment and subsequent enforcement of its own laws. 167 In other words, if a state makes bribery illegal only to then participate in a bribe, equitable estoppel would preclude the host state from invoking the law to escape its own liability. Equitable estoppel thus works to mitigate "the obnoxiousness of self-contradictory behaviour" 168 and is "root- [Vol. 118:117 ed in the continuing need for at least a modicum of stability and for some measure of predictability in the pattern of State conduct." 169 Not only is equitable estoppel supported by "[a] considerable weight of authority," 170 it is regularly applied in international legal disputes. 171 For instance, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has invoked the doctrine to compel jurisdiction when a state's actions caused another party to detrimentally rely on the state's conduct. 172 Equitable estoppel has also been used in investment arbitration. 173 One tribunal suggested that equitable estoppel could justify rejecting a state's argument that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction if the state participated in breaking its own laws or "knowingly overlooked" their violation. 174 The tribunal explained that, in such a case, fairness would "require a tribunal to hold a government estopped from raising violations of its own law as a jurisdictional defense." 175 Likewise, another tribunal defeated a host state's objection to the tribunal's jurisdiction after the tribunal determined that the host state was aware that the investment violated its laws but took no action to enforce them. 176 These cases demonstrate the potential application of equitable estoppel to the corruption context. If bribery violates a state's laws and the state participates in a bribe, it not only knowingly overlooks the violation of its own laws-it effectively sanctions their violation. Therefore, a tribunal is empowered to estop the host state from invoking the corruption defense to deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction.
To hold both parties responsible, an arbitral tribunal should next take the parties' role in the alleged corruption into account when determining the final award. It would be inappropriate for an arbitral tribunal to impose a "one-size-fits-all solution" to assess liability, because not all corrupt acts are the same. 177 Instead, the adjudication of corruption claims requires "a more 169 . Id . at 468-69. 170. CRAWFORD, supra note 37, at 420-21; see also nuanced approach" 178 that assigns responsibility in proportion to fault. 179 This approach is analogous to the use of comparative negligence in tort law. 180 Although investment arbitration proceedings have invoked the contributory-fault approach, 181 they do not seem to have done so in disputes tainted by corruption claims. But a contributory-fault analysis would be efficacious in this context because it would acknowledge that neither party is fully innocent-a corrupt bargain requires actions from both the investor and the host state. 182 Simply, it would allow a tribunal to hold both the host state and investor accountable and reduce the award accordingly.
The contributory-fault approach is beneficial because it affords arbitral tribunals the discretion to hold both parties accountable. 183 Under the contributory-fault approach, an arbitral tribunal could assess whether certain mitigating factors require a reduction of a potential award. This assessment would require "a fact-based inquiry" that would allow the tribunal to determine the relevance of various factors, such as the size, timing, and duration of the bribery scheme. 184 The tribunal could also take into account which party initiated the illicit payment. 185 The contributory-fault approach allows tribunals to evaluate the significance and weight of these factors, providing tribunals with a better opportunity to evaluate both parties' conduct. 186 In addition, the contributory-fault approach helps overcome some of the difficulties of "proving" corruption in arbitral proceedings. 187 183. Torres-Fowler, supra note 85, at 1031 (arguing that the contributory-fault approach "would hold both the investor and the host state accountable for the complicit acts of bribery without enabling the host state to unjustly enrich itself through an act such as expropriation at the expense of the investor"). 184 . Id .; see also Bishop, supra note 177, at 66 ("You must ascertain the precise facts involved . . . [and] look at the precise effects of that corrupt act on the parties and on the contract.").
185. For example, if the tribunal found that the host state extorted the investor and solicited the bribe, that would result in a higher degree of culpability for the host state. Conversely, if the investor initiated the bribe and the host state's role in the act was limited, that would result in a lower degree of culpability for the host state.
186 . Cf . LLAMZON, supra note 10, § 1.02 ("These arbitrators are routinely required by the law to decide in binary fashion, thereby taking overt or implied sides in favour of one party in cases where most, if not all, actors are tainted by corruption.").
187 . Cf ., e .g ., EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 221 (Oct. 8, 2009) (noting that corruption "is notoriously difficult to prove since . . . there is little or no physical evidence").
[Vol. 118:117 but a tribunal lacks investigatory powers and is limited in its ability to subpoena testimony. 188 The contributory-fault approach helps account for these shortcomings because it incentivizes host states and investors to come forward with evidence related to the corrupt act in question for fear of having adverse inferences drawn against them. Specifically, it would leverage the prevailing procedural framework, which assigns each party "the burden of proving the facts on which it relies." 189 This means that the burden would fall on a host state claiming that an investor acted corruptly or on an investor wanting to prove that the host state requested a corrupt solicitation. 190 Thus, the contributory-fault approach incentivizes each party to produce evidence and testimony that either lessens its own liability or enhances the other party's liability. 191 For instance, if the investor can demonstrate that it made efforts at remediation and cooperated with authorities after uncovering that one of its employees participated in a bribe, a tribunal could consider that fact to reduce the investor's liability. 192 This would encourage parties to be forthright about their role in the corruption and would incentivize selfpolicing and reporting of uncovered violations. 193 The contributory-fault approach is theoretically appealing because it mirrors intuitions about justice: allowing a corrupt party to avoid liability altogether feels unfair. 194 Courts do not always explicitly invoke equity in contract evaluation, but equity has nonetheless long played a role in the interpretation of contract terms. 195 Arbitral tribunals have been responsive to the notion of fairness. For example, in the Metal-Tech case, the tribunal dismissed the dispute for a lack of jurisdiction, but noted that the host state had 190 . Id . This approach is supported by the UNCITRAL procedural rules, which assert that "[e]ach party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support his claim or defence." G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 24 § 1 (Dec. 15, 1976).
191. ICSID and UNCITRAL provide arbitral tribunals with discretion over the appropriate standard of proof required to satisfy a party's burden. See Rose, supra note 188, at 194. While an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the optimal standard of proof is outside the scope of this Note, arbitral tribunals should coordinate with national and international authorities to ensure that the tribunal's findings do not have a res judicata effect on either party and work in tandem with anti-corruption enforcement efforts.
192 participated in the corruption. 196 Based on the host state's participation, the tribunal reasoned, "it appears fair that the Parties share in the costs" of the arbitration. 197 And even when Judge Lagergren declined to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute involving corruption in ICC Case No. 1110, he expressed concern that "care must be taken to see that one party is not thereby enabled to reap the fruits of his own dishonest conduct." 198 Ultimately, the contributory-fault approach is more equitable than declining to exercise jurisdiction because it holds both parties accountable and empowers the arbitral tribunal to consider the unique facts of the dispute in its decision. When combined with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the contributory-fault approach would help reduce the liability asymmetry in investment arbitration. 199 
B. Aligning Investment Arbitration and Anti-Corruption
The proposed framework would also benefit the internationalinvestment and anti-corruption regimes. The framework would benefit international investment because it empowers arbitral tribunals to exercise jurisdiction over disputes involving corruption, thereby helping ensure access to a tribunal for aggrieved investors. And greater certainty about access to a tribunal would reduce the risk of investment, thereby facilitating investment. 200 While the proposed framework benefits the international investment regime, it also complements international anti-corruption enforcement because it holds more parties responsible for their roles in corrupt acts. Some commentators, however, have challenged the investment arbitration regime directly. 201 For instance, these critics are concerned that investment arbitration disproportionately benefits investors from developed countries at the expense of developing countries. 202 To them, the investment treaty regime itself was created for investors, and claims about developmental benefits are merely incidental to the primary goal of investor-wealth max- [Vol. 118:117 imization. 203 These critics would likely be skeptical of the proposed framework because it facilitates investors' access to arbitral tribunals, thereby increasing host states' potential legal liability. 204 But while the proposed framework promotes investors' access to tribunals, it also benefits host states and their citizens because it assists anticorruption efforts. Arbitral tribunals that decline to exercise jurisdiction over a corruption-tainted dispute fail to address the demand side of corruption. This failure allows the host state to escape liability for its role in the corrupt act and thus helps the state avoid internalizing the costs of its own conduct. 205 Moreover, this failure is at odds with UNCAC, which discourages both the supply side and the demand side of corruption. 206 The proposed framework provides an incentive for host states to minimize corruption and would work in tandem with UNCAC by holding both investors and host states responsible for their illicit conduct. Therefore, the proposed framework benefits host states as well as investors.
Since the 1990s, there has been an international recognition that corruption is detrimental to economic growth, but anti-corruption enforcement has been inconsistent. 207 A major reason for this enforcement difficulty is the inability of international anti-corruption conventions, such as UNCAC, to account for states' idiosyncratic enforcement preferences and understandings of corruption. 208 So while occasional enforcement actions are symbolically valuable, 209 UNCAC largely remains an "aspirational framework," 210 a lex simulata. 211 In light of these shortcomings, commentators have noted the potential for the private enforcement of anti-corruption laws. 212 Investment arbitration is one such solution. 213 The proposed framework need not supplant national anti-corruption enforcement efforts. 214 Rather, under this framework, an arbitral tribunal's authority would be limited to the commercial consequences of the contract. It would still be up to the national criminal justice system to pursue a criminal offense. When combined with sufficient coordination and communication between national authorities and arbitral institutions, 215 investment arbitration could complement public enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Ultimately, the proposed framework does more than "improve coherence between [investment treaties] and other bodies of international law and policy." 216 The framework addresses the supply and demand sides of corruption by evaluating each party's role in a given corrupt act. This not only furthers anti-corruption goals but also strengthens the legitimacy of investment arbitration as a dispute resolution forum that is capable of "produc[ing] just results." 217 Investment arbitration may take broader public concerns into account because the dispute necessarily involves a sovereign state as a party. Thus, investment arbitration may be considered a "public law discipline." 218 In a dispute between two private parties, arbitrators are obligated to apply private law principles and consider only the four corners of the contract. 219 In the context of investment arbitration, however, corruption and other public policy considerations-such as environmental, human rights, and social poli- [Vol. 118:117 cies-are "within the ambit of an investment arbitrator's decisionmaking." 220 Moreover, because most arbitrations are not subject to review by courts, 221 arbitral tribunals are the only bodies positioned to effectively consider corruption claims under investment treaties. 222 If arbitral tribunals do not consider these corruption claims, and a host state underenforces its own anti-corruption laws, corruption will continue. Therefore, an arbitral tribunal that explicitly considers corruption in its assessment of an investment dispute's merits would assist the anti-corruption regime. Additionally, it would further an intimately related and normatively valuable goal: economic development.
C. A Path Forward for International Development
The proposed framework would promote development by incentivizing investment and combating corruption. These goals are valuable in and of themselves, but they are also responsive to current trends in international investment law. In its most recent annual investment report, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) found that states across the globe are reforming their investment treaties. 223 These reforms include writing new treaties to take into account public policy considerations and updating old treaties to do the same. 224 The reforms are principally focused on promoting development, which is "the underlying purpose" of investment treaties. 225 Crucially, while these reforms reflect a heightened interest in public policy considerations, they do not represent a lack of interest in foreign investment.
On the contrary, many countries have made substantial domestic efforts to facilitate investment. In 2017, sixty-five countries adopted policies that sought to liberalize and promote investment. 226 These policies include the establishment of new special economic zones, simplified administrative procedures, and eased foreign entry into the transport, energy, and manufacturing industries. 227 Some critics, however, would prefer a more fundamental change to international investment law; they have proposed replacing in-vestment arbitration tribunals with an international investment court housed in the European Union 228 or the World Trade Organization. 229 Investment-court proponents argue that investment arbitration suffers from a fragmentation problem: numerous tribunals and a lack of precedent 230 make for inconsistent decisions. 231 They reason that tenured judges and an appellate mechanism would create precedent and promote consistency in arbitral decisionmaking, 232 which would enhance the overall legitimacy of investment arbitration. 233 Although an investment court might increase consistency, its flaws outweigh its theoretical benefits.
The most significant issue with an investment court is that it would undermine state sovereignty. Critics of investment arbitration already argue that it intrudes upon a state's sovereignty because it allows an investor to bring suit if a regulation or other state action arguably violates an investment treaty. 234 But at least under investment tribunals, this limitation on state sovereignty is "modest . . . and is essential to creating a basis for effective and efficient foreign-investment activities." 235 An investment court, however, would subject a state to supranational legal obligations 236 that would erode the state's legislative power. 237 Despite assertions that state sovereignty is "a quaint and outdated idea," 238 the past few years have revealed that skepticism toward international institutions and concerns over state sovereignty are alive and well. 239 In the current political climate, an investment court would [Vol. 118:117 likely struggle to receive sufficient buy-in from investors, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the court itself. 240 An added concern with an investment court is that it would both be costly and face significant bureaucratic hurdles to implementation. 241 There are also questions whether awards rendered by the investment court would even be enforceable under the ICSID Convention. 242 Regardless of one's perspectives on the potential benefits of an investment court (or on the merits of BITs generally), the proposed framework remains useful. For investment-court opponents, the proposed framework represents a solution to handle corruption allegations in investment arbitration. For investment-court proponents, the proposed framework is a useful interim solution. Either way, investment tribunals are one of the only institutions "in the international legal order where the infrastructure is already in place to regulate foreign investment, including those tainted with corruption, in an authoritative and controlling manner." 243 Therefore, the proposed framework is a practical, promising means to incentivize investment, combat corruption, and ultimately promote development.
The proposed framework would prove particularly effective if made in concert with other proposals to reform investment arbitration. There are legitimate concerns with the current embodiment of investment arbitration, such as the lack of transparency, 244 potential bias from arbitrators, 245 and limits on states' ability to enact legislation. 246 While reforms aimed at any of these issues would likely help increase the legitimacy of investment arbitration, reforms to increase transparency in particular would augment the proposed framework by helping hold parties accountable. Specifically, the International Bar Association has suggested that arbitral tribunals could provide public access to hearings, publish materials used in the proceedings, and disclose third-party funders. 247 If arbitral tribunals embraced the proposed framework and adjudicated corruption claims, these transparency reforms would provide an additional incentive for investors and host states to avoid corruption: they would have to answer for their crimes in the court of public opinion and internalize the resulting reputational damage. 248 Even without other reforms, the proposed framework is one significant step toward holding both parties responsible for their role in corruption. Ultimately, rather than conducting a zero-sum economic analysis of corruption, this framework recognizes the potential for international investment arbitration to complement the anti-corruption regime and achieve developmental goals. 249 
CONCLUSION
In the face of isolationist and protectionist trends, 250 it is unsurprising that international institutions such as investment arbitration are facing a legitimacy crisis. 251 But the global economy remains interconnected, 252 providing a window of opportunity for reforms to investment arbitration that enhance its viability. The ability of investment arbitration to work "in tandem with . . . the political and economic context in which [investment treaties] operate, will determine the shape of the next era." 253 Thus, the proposed framework-which applies equitable estoppel and a contributory-fault analysis to corruption-tainted disputes-helps address the contemporary challenges in investment arbitration because it balances the interests of investors and host states. As such, this framework represents one means to enhance the legitimacy of investment arbitration itself.
